Music

Gray v. Perry: The Pendulum Swings on Copyright Infringement Verdict against Katy Perry

By Scott J. Sholder

Following hot on the heels of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision clearing Led Zeppelin of copyright infringement allegations relating to the classic “Stairway to Heaven” (which we reported here), a California federal judge last week overturned a jury’s finding of copyright infringement against Katy Perry regarding the pop hit “Dark Horse.”  Songwriters still nervous in a post-“Blurred Lines” world will likely take solace in two decisions that – while in many ways different from Pharrell Williams’ and Robin Thicke’s case – solidify certain aspects of copyright law that may help musicians rest and write a bit easier.

The genesis of the “Dark Horse” case is not unlike any other you-copied-my-song litigation.  Plaintiffs, successful songwriters and musicians in their own right, sued pop star Katy Perry, several other songwriters, and the record labels and publishers behind “Dark Horse,” claiming that an eight-note ostinato – a “short musical phrase or rhythmic pattern repeated in a musical composition” – in “Dark Horse” was substantially similar to one in plaintiffs’ song “Joyful Noise.”  The alleged similarity between musical phrases as opposed to full musical compositions makes the “Dark Horse” case more like “Stairway to Heaven” than “Blurred Lines,” which dealt with infringement of an entire song.  This distinction informed the court’s legal analysis as well, as discussed further below.

After a two-week trial in the summer of 2019, a jury found the defendants liable for copyright infringement and awarded plaintiffs $2.8 million in damages, and the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law (or for a new trial).  Courts will grant motions for judgment as a matter of law when there are no genuine factual disputes and “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”  The court found these standards to be satisfied.

The court primarily addressed the evidence presented in support of the jury’s finding that the defendants’ ostinato was “substantially similar” to that of plaintiffs.  As we discussed in connection with the “Stairway to Heaven” case [here], courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a two-step test to determine whether two works are substantially similar.  Part one, the “extrinsic” test, sets forth a question of law for the court (often aided by experts) whether protected elements of the plaintiff’s work are objectively similar to corresponding elements of the defendants’ work.  Part two, the “intrinsic” test, asks the jury to decide whether an ordinary reasonable person would find that the “total concept and feel” of the works was substantially similar.  The court spent most of its analysis on part one.

As a threshold matter, the court explained that, where the work at issue consists of a combination of unprotected elements, an enforceable right in that combination only exists if the “elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship.”  This nuance is particularly relevant in music cases; citing “Stairway to Heaven,” the court explained that where “there is a narrow range of available creative choices” (such as notes in a scale or pleasing combinations of sounds) copyright protection is “thin” and to infringe, the allegedly infringing copy must be virtually identical.  The difference between this case and the “Blurred Lines” case, according to the court, is that the “thin copyright” doctrine typically will not apply to entire musical works (as opposed to constituent elements).  Citing its obligation to balance the First Amendment against the Copyright Act, the court also noted that the inherent nature of music as an art form was to borrow and build upon what had previously been created given that “many if not most of the elements that appear in popular music are not individually protectable.” 

With this backdrop, the court first analyzed the constituent elements of plaintiffs’ ostinato, including the key, phrase length, pitch sequence, rhythm “shape,” and musical texture.  Finding these elements to be individually common or even ubiquitous in pop music, the court held that “the uncontroverted evidence points to only one conclusion: that none of these individual elements are independently protectable.”  This conclusion was supported by testimony from the plaintiff’s own expert musicologist.

The same conclusion was apparent when analyzing the elements taken together as combined: their selection, arrangement, and coordination was not original enough to warrant protection as an original work of authorship.  The court held that the ostinato in “Joyful Noise” did not contain enough musical elements arranged in a “sufficiently original manner to warrant copyright protection.”  While it is possible that a musical phrase as short as eight notes could be protected, the court noted the dearth of on-point cases where “an otherwise unprotected musical phrase, isolated from the rest of the musical composition, in fact warranted copyright protection.”  The court explained that it was undisputed in light of the evidence at trial that “the signature elements of the 8-note ostinato in ‘Joyful Noise’” including its pitch sequence and rhythm, were “not a particularly unique or rare combination,” and that prior works composed by the parties and many others contained similar elements.  The ostinato’s musical timbre, its “pingy synthesizer sound,”’ and its use of minor key did not tip the scales.

The court accordingly held that the ostinato did not constitute protectable expression and therefore the extrinsic test (step one) failed, entitling the defendants to judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the jury verdict to the contrary.  Although arguably not strictly necessary in light of this threshold ruling, the court went on to explain that, even if the plaintiffs’ ostinato was protectable, the defendants’ ostinato was not substantially similar.  Owing to the “thin” nature of the protection that would have been afforded to the plaintiff’s composition had it been deemed copyrightable, the degree of similarity would have had to have been “virtually identical” for a finding of infringement, and the evidence did not support such a conclusion given “a number of undisputed objective distinctions,” as corroborated by plaintiffs’ own musicologist.

Interestingly, despite the court’s conclusion that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the extrinsic test (arguably obviating the need to address the intrinsic test), the court proceeded to opine on the jury’s finding of intrinsic similarity.  Because the intrinsic test is fact-sensitive and a question solely for the jury, the court held that, despite the court’s reversal on extrinsic liability, a reasonable jury could have found that the “total concept and feel” of the two ostinatos were “intrinsically” similar.  This of course did not change the outcome of the decision.

The court also found that there had been enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had accessed the defendants’ song.  Citing “Stairway to Heaven,” the court noted that reasonable minds could find that defendants “had a reasonable opportunity to [hear] plaintiff’s work” particularly in light of the current ubiquity of musical content and ready access to digital media online.  In such circumstances access could be established “by a trivial showing that the work is available on demand,” and “Joyful Noise” had garnered more than 6 million plays online, hundreds of concert performances, and a Grammy nomination.  But again, this did not change the result.

The “Dark Horse” case follows in the footsteps of “Stairway to Heaven” in establishing stricter boundaries around what musical elements are protectable but indirectly diminishing the importance of access in light of digital media and technological advancements.  As the decision is applicable to song elements like ostinatos, and arguably by analogy guitar riffs or solos, basslines, synthesizer accompaniments and the like – as opposed to entire compositions – it will likely cabin future claims concerning these discrete musical structures and reduce the likelihood that a songwriter or performer will be hit with a multi-million-dollar jury verdict for creating a single song element.  Decisions like “Dark Horse” and “Stairway to Heaven” will likely provide some comfort to musicians in being able to rely on those who came before them in writing their parts, but at the same time the decisions leave undisturbed the lessons from “Blurred Lines” when it comes to similarity of musical compositions in the aggregate whether one agrees with the outcome of that case or not.

Ninth Circuit Rules in Favor of Led Zeppelin, Laying A New Foundation for Music Cases to Follow

By Phillip E. Jackman

When the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on en banc rehearing issued its opinion in the appeal of the widely reported Led Zeppelin Stairway to Heaven case on March 9, 2020, the court took a substantial step in providing guidance for future copyright infringement claims based on allegations of “substantial similarity” between songs. 

The music industry feared a potential seismic shift in how music could be created without exposure to copyright liability after a panel of Ninth Circuit judges voted 2-1 to uphold a jury verdict in favor of the heirs of Marvin Gaye on their claim against Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams in the Blurred Lines case. In her strong dissent, Circuit Judge Jacqueline Nguyen said the decision let the Gayes “accomplish what no one has before: copyright a musical style,” and warned that the decision expanded the potential for further copyright litigation.

Around the same that the Blurred Lines trial commenced, another seminal case was filed that addressed essentially the same issue – whether basic uncopyrightable elements of song writing, if selected and arranged in a certain manner, could then be deemed copyrightable.

In May 2014, Michael Skidmore, serving as the trustee for the estate of Randy California, late front man for the band Spirit, filed a lawsuit against Led Zeppelin, accusing the band of copying the famous intro to Stairway to Heaven from Spirit’s 1967 instrumental ballad called Taurus.  Skidmore claimed the portion of Taurus protected by copyright is the song’s 8-measure descending chromatic scale intro, which is similar to the descending chromatic chord progression in Stairway to Heaven.  In Los Angeles federal district court, a jury ultimately sided with Led Zeppelin because Skidmore did not satisfy the “substantial similarity” test, finding that although Zeppelin had access to “Taurus,” the elements of the song that were shared by Stairway to Heaven were not original enough to be protected under copyright law.

Skidmore appealed the verdict to the Ninth Circuit, arguing, among other things,that the district court erred in its decisions to apply the Copyright Act of 1909 to Taurus and not allow Skidmore to play for the jury the actual recorded version of Taurus to buttress his argument of substantial similarity between the songs.  The district court had only permitted Skidmore to put into evidence the “bare-bones” sheet music of Taurus deposited at the U.S. Copyright Office to demonstrate that the intro to Stairway was “substantially similar” to Taurus because at the time of its creation and under the 1909 law, sound recordings were not protected by copyright, only musical compositions.  In September 2018, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel sided with Skidmore, in part, and overturned the jury verdict due to its finding that the jury instructions failed to inform the jurors that unprotectable elements of a song could be protected by copyright law when “selected” or “arranged” in creative ways.

However, before the case went back to district court, the Ninth Circuit agreed to vacate the panel ruling and rehear the case en banc, indicating that the case presented many open questions for the future of music law.  In its decision, the full Ninth Circuit analyzed the two factors required by Skidmore to prove copyright infringement: (1) he owned a valid copyright in Taurus; and (2) that Led Zeppelin copied protected aspects of the work.

In consideration of the first factor, the court first had to decide whether copyright protection of Taurus would fall under the Copyright Act of 1909, or the 1976 revision and limited protection afforded sound recordings created after February 15, 1972.  This issue proved to be pivotal in the case because it was only with the passage of the 1971 amendment, followed by the Copyright Act of 1976, that Congress opened the door for artists (or labels) to obtain copyright protection over master sound recordings of musical compositions.  Up until this time, artists like Spirit could only submit sheet music for copyright registration under the 1909 Act.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s holding by concluding “that the 1909 Act controls and the deposit copy [registered in 1967] defines the scope of the Taurus copyright.”  With this finding the Ninth Circuit closed the door on Skidmore’s argument that he should be able to play the recorded version of Taurus for the jury, since Skidmore did not own a valid copyright in the sound recording.

Armed only with copyright protection in a single page of sheet music, the Ninth Circuit then turned to the facts applicable to whether Skidmore had put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy the test that Stairway to Heaven was similar enough to Stairway to Heaven for unlawful copying to have occurred.  The Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test to determine whether works are substantially similar.  The first part compares the objective similarities of specific expressive elements in the works at issue, referred to as the “extrinsic test” and typically involves expert witnesses. The second part, known as the “intrinsic test,” looks at similarity of expression from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable observer, with no expert assistance.

At trial, the jury had found in favor of Led Zeppelin on the question of whether “original elements of the musical composition Taurus are extrinsically similar to Stairway to Heaven,” and as a result did not move on the intrinsic test.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s approach stating that “because the extrinsic test was not satisfied, the jury did not [need to] reach the intrinsic test.”

The final key issue in this case is that the full Ninth Circuit abrogated the “inverse ratio rule,” which had permitted a lower standard of proof to satisfy the “substantial similarity” test if a plaintiff could demonstrate that the alleged infringer had a high degree of access to the protected work.  During trial, neither party disputed the fact that, during the late-1960s/early-1970s, Spirit and Led Zeppelin played at various venues together on at least three occasions, but there is no evidence the groups never toured together.  One of Skidmore’s key arguments was that the district court erred by not submitting the “inverse ratio rule” to the jury.  The Ninth Circuit stated that “the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the rule”.  And, in agreement with the district court, the Ninth Circuit further stated that “[b]ecause the inverse ratio rule, which is not part of the copyright statue, defies logic, and creates uncertainty for the courts and the parties, we take this opportunity to abrogate the rule in the Ninth Circuit and overrule our prior cases to the contrary.”

The court’s elimination of the reverse-ratio rule is a significant development and substantial clarification of the law in California that will likely be seen as a boon to creators of modern music.  Access to music is now more ubiquitous than ever, so it stands to reason that plaintiffs would inevitably be able to seize on the lesser standard of similarity in cases involving modern music. Of course, for those cases arising out of “classic” works like Stairway to Heaven, the abrogation of the reverse-ratio rule, may be seen as one less arrow in the copyright protection quiver.  How creators synthesize this ruling, whether in defense or pursuit of copyright claims, remains to be seen, but the impact will likely be a significant one.

The case is Michael Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, et al, case number 16-56057, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

CDAS Partners Briana C. Hill and Benjamin Jaffe Named Co-Chairs of the Entertainment and the Digital Media & Technology groups, respectively.

Briana Hill, Co-Head of the Beverly Hills office of Cowan DeBaets Abrahams & Sheppard LLP, joins Fred Bimbler and Simon Pulman in leading the firm’s Entertainment group, which includes televison (traditional to broadband), streaming, film, new media, talent, theatre and podcasting. The group assists clients with their entertainment projects through early development, the solicitation of investment, production and ultimate distribution, securing all necessary rights and negotiating agreements with top-tier talent.

Ben Jaffe joins Joshua Sessler in leading the Digital Media & Technology group that represents top digital talent, including game developers and distributors, digital agencies, production houses, broadband video networks, mobile app developers, podcasters and social media ventures. The group provides counsel to a wide range of social media, transmedia and mobile plays that are using emerging software and hardware technologies to create, develop and distribute content in new ways.

Fair Use in Gaming Content – FAQS For Creators

By Simon Pulman and Mikaela Gross

Fair use is one of the most important – and most misunderstood – concepts in the area of copyright law. It is an important concept for anyone who is using content owned by third parties – which includes anyone who livestreams gaming, creates “let’s play” videos or otherwise uses gaming assets and branding. Unfortunately, there is a lot of misinformation on the internet and thus creators are often unclear about their rights and responsibilities.

With that said, here are answers to some frequently asked questions for creators:

What is Fair Use?

Fair use is an exception to the general principle that unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is copyright infringement. Simply put, if a claim of copyright infringement is brought against a defendant, the “defendant” can try to demonstrate they made a fair use of the allegedly infringed work in order to prevail in the case.

Because fair use is a defense, only a court can say whether a particular use of copyrighted material is a “fair use.” However, experienced attorneys can provide an opinion, based on their evaluation of the use using the four-factor test (see below) and their knowledge of case law.

What are the Four Factors?

Courts look at four factors when making a fair use determination

  • the purpose and character of your use
  • the nature of the copyrighted work
  • the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and
  • the effect of the use upon the potential market.

The application of these four factors is nuanced and often complicated, but in short, the use of a copyrighted work is not likely to be fair use if it is used for the same or a similar purpose for which it was originally intended or in advertising/marketing materials, uses a lot of the original work including its most important parts (what the courts have called “the heart of the work”), and/or is used in a manner that competes with the market for the original work. It is more likely to be fair use if the new use is “transformative” in that it comments on, critiques, or otherwise adds new meaning to the original work in some way, if only a small portion of the original work is used (i.e., only enough for the user to make their point), and if the original work is not being used to advertise or otherwise promote the new work or use. So, if a video talks about, for example, loot box mechanics or the historical treatment of race in gaming by using game clips as examples, commenting on and analyzing those clips, it is probably more likely from a legal perspective to be fair use than straight game footage.

Note, however, that there is no bright line amount of use that constitutes fair use. For example, you can never assume that “if you use less than 5%, that’s fair use” – courts have found using only a line or two of text or music to be infringing. If you are in doubt, you should speak to a lawyer.

Is Crediting Important?

It’s nice, and may be considered best practices or industry custom, but it’s generally not relevant for a legal determination of fair use.

Can’t I Use a Disclaimer?

In short, no. Those disclaimers that you see on YouTube stating “This is a fair use. No copyright infringement intended” are generally not legally relevant. There is a small chance that they could be helpful to you in determining the damages that you owe in the event that you are found to be infringing, however, because they may bear on whether your intent was “innocent” or “willful.”

What if I get a DMCA takedown notice? And if a website removes my video, do I have any recourse?

The DMCA notice and takedown process provides copyright owners with a way to request removal of their copyrighted work from a website or other internet service if they believe the use infringes their copyright. To benefit from the “safe harbor” from copyright infringement the DMCA provides ISPs, the website or platform must designate a registered agent to receive and process DMCA takedown notices.  DMCA notices must include certain specific information to comply with the law, and the registered agent of the ISP has the job of reviewing and determining whether to comply with the takedown request.

An ISP, such as a platform that hosts gaming content, does not have to comply with a DMCA notice if the notice does not fully comply with the legal requirements for a takedown notice. However, if an ISP does remove content following receipt of a DMCA notice, it must also promptly notify the party that posted the video. That party then can file a counternotice if it believes the content was wrongfully taken down, for instance if the use of the copyrighted work is likely to be a fair use.

Whether you’re a platform looking to benefit from the protections of the DMCA safe harbor, or a content creator looking to correct an improper takedown of your video content, you should consult with an attorney to make sure you’re in compliance with the DMCA’s requirements, and are not taking any actions that could potentially subject you to liability down the line.

Will I Be Sued For My Videogame Videos?

This is where we have good news. Because video game publishers largely view streaming and game-related media to be helpful to their business (under the theory that exposing more people to the game will increase sales), publishers rarely bring copyright infringement lawsuits against gamers. The exceptions where publishers do bring legal action tend to arise in instances where users create new installments of games (what lawyers and courts would call “derivative works”) without authorization, insert other infringing material into games via mods, create and sell software “cheats,” or do something that is offensive in addition to being infringing (e.g., adding explicit or hateful material). In recent years, major players such as Take-Two Interactive and Epic Games have actively policed these types of infringements of their copyrighted games.

This means that it isn’t always necessary to apply the fair use analysis outlined above. However, those creators who are seeking to make heavy commercial use of game assets (other than solely streaming/YouTube video revenue) should consult with an attorney before embarking on their plans to ensure compliance with copyright law.

One of the greatest challenges in defending claims of copyright infringement in the gaming space seems to be the wildcard of the judge’s expertise and understanding of the emerging fields of gaming and streaming. A key defense strategy will inevitably involve a careful framing of the discussion, including describing how the game works, what the purpose of the video is, explaining the meaning of common terms, and the context and communities in which these activities exist online.

Moreover, everyone should keep an eye on the risk factors listed below.

What Red Flags should I be aware of?

While the use of gaming footage in the form of livestreaming and “let’s play” type videos rarely results in a claim, there are a number of uses that creators should be particularly cautious about:

  • Licensed music: Any game video that features licensed popular music is more likely to cause an issue with the game creators and/or the owners of the rights in the music being used. Creators are generally fine with exhibiting those videos on YouTube (which has a blanket license with multiple labels), but uses of music in other contexts or on other sites could trigger a DMCA takedown or a copyright infringement claim.
  • Choreography: Any videos that use choreography or dance moves tend to pose a higher risk. There has been a spate of recent choreography-related claims alleging that games have made unauthorized use of protected dance moves, in particular against Epic Games for the use of short animations in its game Fortnite. Choreography is probably an overlooked area (versus other areas of copyright risk) and thus it is not a fait accompli that the game publisher will have secured the rights, so a video creator could be pulled into a potential lawsuit. Obviously dance-focused games are highest risk, but other games that include “celebration dances” are also a risk. While many recent choreography-related claims have failed because copyright law does not protect simple routines or common social dances, they are nonetheless costly to defend and could become increasingly risky as the law develops in this area.
  • Street Art and Tags:  Videos that include any kind of pre-existing graffiti or tags, or even original designs that closely resemble a pre-existing artwork, are similarly susceptible to a copyright infringement claim. Street artists have become notorious copyright infringement plaintiffs in recent years, and like choreography, game creators may not have cleared the rights to these works. The unauthorized use of graffiti may also raise trademark and right of publicity claims, depending on the context in which the tag is used.  
  • Athletes and other Identifiable Real People: Any gaming footage that includes the recognizable likenesses of real people (e.g., sports games) is susceptible to a claim. This is not actually a copyright issue, but rather falls under what lawyers call “right of publicity” (i.e., a person’s exclusive right to make commercial use of their name [or alias], likeness and other identifiable features). User-generated content that inserts a real person into a game via a mod could also trigger a claim of this type, particularly from celebrities who regularly monetize their names and likenesses.

A Closer Look: Senate Passes Music Modernization Act

On September 18, 2018, after months of intense negotiations with various music industry groups and lobbying interests, the United States Senate unanimously approved the Music Modernization Act (now renamed the Orrin G. Hatch Music Modernization Act, “MMA”), clearing what many believe to be the last major hurdle required for the MMA to become the most significant piece of music copyright legislation to be signed into law in almost two decades.  The Senate version of the MMA will now be sent back down to the House for reconsideration (the House approved an earlier version back in April 2018 and is expected to approve the Senate version) before being signed into law by the President.

As with the House version, the Senate version of the MMA combines three main pieces of legislation, which accomplish the following: Continue reading

Update – Three Music Industry Reform Bills to Watch: Congress Introduces Legislation to Modernize Music in the Digital Age

On September 18, 2018, the Senate unanimously approved the Music Modernization Act, now renamed the Orrin G. Hatch Music Modernization Act, in honor of the retiring Utah Senator – an avid songwriter who spearheaded the bill.  This approval follows its unanimous passing by the House of Representatives in April.  Due to changes made by the Senate, the bill will now return to the House for approval before it can be signed by President Trump to become law.  Public praise of this significant step has poured out from a variety of major industry players including the NMPA, the RIAA, BMI, ASCAP, the Recording Academy, and SoundExchange.  The bill’s supporters have uniformly expressed that such legislation is crucial in the fight for fairness for music creators and that it will also confer benefits on consumers and copyright holders.  While the precise details of the alterations that were made to the Act are not yet clear, many changes appear to have influenced by holdouts from satellite and digital broadcasting services, including a compromise proposal from SiriusXM to pay half of the performance royalties for pre-1972 recordings under the CLASSICS Act.  As of this writing, it is expected that the bill will pass within the next few weeks, marking the first music licensing reform in over two decades. Continue reading

Three Music Industry Reform Bills to Watch: Congress Introduces Legislation to Modernize Music in the Digital Age

In a rare show of bipartisanship, Congress has proposed legislation that would financially benefit music creators who have either been overlooked in the past or are compensated on inconsistent terms.  Three bills –  the Fair Play, Fair Pay Act, the CLASSICS Act and the Music Modernization Act (all of which have bipartisan support) – were introduced in 2017 to reform Copyright laws and bring balance to the music industry.  As copyright reform has gained much traction in the past month, with a House Judiciary field hearing that took place in New York City on January 26, 2018, the three bills represent hope for change and needed updates in the digital music era.

Fair Play, Fair Pay Act

The Fair Play, Fair Pay Act, introduced March 2017, aims to extend a copyright owner’s rights to include the right to perform a sound recording publicly by means of any transmission – including traditional broadcast.  Currently, the Copyright Act affords the owners of musical compositions (the underlying music and lyrics) the right to perform a sound recording publicly, but only provides a much narrower public performance right for owners of sound recordings, limited to performance by means of digital transmissions by cable, satellite, and internet radio stations.  For instance, when an internet radio station such as Pandora streams a song, the artist and record label receive a statutory royalty for the performance of the sound recording, but when that same song is played on terrestrial AM/FM radio, the artist and record label are not compensated (in both scenarios the writer and/or publisher of the song is paid for the performance of the composition, though).  The radio industry has consistently defended the lack of monetary compensation for radio air play, citing the promotional value that radio uniquely brings an artist and record label. Continue reading

Copyright Royalty Board Announces Compulsory Mechanical License Rate Hike for Interactive Streaming/Limited Download Services

On January 26, 2018, the United States Copyright Royalty Board (the “CRB”) released its initial determination regarding the royalty rates and terms of use that will apply over the next five years to the compulsory license of musical compositions in connection with the distribution of physical and digital phonorecords (sound recordings not accompanying an audio-visual work).  The highly anticipated ruling is the result of a CRB rate hearing that was initiated by the National Music Publishers’ Association and the Nashville Songwriters Association International and that took place between March and June of last year.  The new rules will become effective as of the date the CRB releases its final determination, which amongst other things, will include the CRB’s rate determinations for physical phonorecord deliveries and permanent downloads not yet addressed in the initial CRB announcement.  The final determination will result in a substantial increase to the mechanical royalty rate to be paid by interactive streaming/limited download services such as Spotify, Apple, Amazon, and Google. Continue reading

In re: Tam Take Two: Federal Circuit Strikes Down Disparagement Provision of Lanham Act § 2(a)

In May we reported that a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had affirmed the USPTO’s denial of a registration for the trademark “THE SLANTS” to refer to an all-Asian-American rock band, but had, in a prescient “additional views” opinion, prompted en banc reconsideration.  A majority of the full Federal Circuit held last week that the provision of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“Section 2(a)”) which prohibits the registration of “disparaging” trademarks violates of the First Amendment, and vacated the USPTO’s holding that Simon Shiao Tam’s mark was unregisterable.

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Redskins Redux: In re: Simon Shiao Tam and the Fate of “Disparaging” Trademarks

Last year we reported on the hotly debated ruling of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) in Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc., which cancelled six trademarks belonging to the Washington Redskins football team on the grounds that those marks were disparaging to Native Americans.  While the district court appeal of that decision remains pending in the summary judgment phase, a new dispute concerning another racially charged trademark has paved the way for a potentially significant ruling by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the key underpinning of the Blackhorse case: the constitutionality of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“Section 2(a)”).

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